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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In reviewing

the

summary

judgment

entered

in

favor of

Wadsworth, the Court of Appeals should evaluate all the evidence
and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most
favorable to the County.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the County,
the board of county commissioners had a "reasonable basis" for
rejecting

Wadsworth's

bid

proposal

as non-responsive

County's invitation for bids because:

to the

(1) Wadsworth violated the

instructions to bidders and the rules governing bids set forth in
the County's

invitation

for bids,

(2) the irregularities in

Wadsworth's bid made it ambiguous as to the total bid price, and
(3) the ambiguity in Wadsworth's bid gave Wadsworth an unfair
competitive advantage over other bidders by allowing Wadsworth to
claim either price as its intended bid. The board's determination
did

not

involve

fraud,

collusion,

misconduct,

or

abuse

of

discretion, and in the absence of such a finding, the district
court erred by improperly substituting the court's own judgment for
that of the board.
The confusion caused by the irregularity in Wadsworth's bid
proposal was not remedied by the letter sent to the County two days
after the bid opening.

The determination of responsiveness of a

bid must be based solely on the bid documents themselves as they
appear at the time of the bid opening.

Subsequent communications

as to what a bidder "intended", especially with regard to price,
cannot be considered and are without effect after the bids have
1

been opened.
Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that Wadsworth's bid
proposal was wrongfully rejected, Wcidsworth was still not entitled
to summary judgment under the theories of breach of contract and
negligence. There was no contract, express or implied, between the
County and Wadsworth. Nor have the courts recognized any cause of
action for "negligent consideration and rejection of bids" in the
area of public construction contracts.

The appropriate standard

of judicial review for contested awards of public construction
contracts is that the courts will not attempt to control the
discretion of public officials, nor substitute the courts1 judgment
for that of the public officials, except upon evidence of abuse of
discretion, fraud, or corruption.

This is true even if the

officials1 decision appears erroneous or if reasonable persons may
disagree.
Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that Wadsworth's bid
proposal was wrongfully rejected, the judicial remedies available
to Wadsworth as a wrongfully rejected bidder do not include an
award for anticipated lost profits.

Even if they did, Wadsworth

failed to meet its burden of proof as to the amount of lost
profits.

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD VIEW THE EVIDENCE AND ALL
REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE COUNTY.
In its brief, Wadsworth acknowledges that the standard for
review of a motion for summary judgment is that "...the court must
evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly
drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment." Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates,
Inc., 739 P.2d 634, at 637 (Utah App. 1987).

This Court has also

held that the same standard applies when reviewing a summary
judgment granted by a lower court.

English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d

1154, at 1156 (Utah App. 1989); Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767
P.2d 941, at 946 (Utah App. 1989).
Wadsworth argues, however, that the above standard does not
apply in the present case.

On page 1 of its brief, Wadsworth

contends that because the County produced photocopies of the bid
documents, rather than the originals, a "presumption favorable to
Wadsworth arises" and the district court was therefore justified
in failing to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
County on the issue of bid responsiveness.

Wadsworth's argument

is without merit for the following reasons:
First, under Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the
original of a writing is not required and other evidence of the
contents of the writing is admissible if the originals are lost or
have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them
3

in bad faith.

In addition, under Rule 1003, a duplicate is

admissible to the same extent as an original where, as in the
present case, no genuine question is raised as to the authenticity
of the original and it would not be unfair to admit the duplicate
in lieu of the original.
In the present case, Wadsworth waited over four (4) years
after filing this lawsuit before filing a request for production
of the original bid documents (R. 376). In all proceedings before
the

district

court, Wadsworth

accepted

and

relied

upon

photocopies without any question as to their authenticity.

the
The

County, after making a diligent search of its own records (and
after requesting thcit the outside consultant which verified and
tabulated the bids also search its records for the originals),
responded that, to the best of its knowledge, the original bid
documents could not be located and were not in the County's
possession.
It

is also

important

to note

that

two

of

Wadsworth's

employees, Ralph Wadsworth and Guy Wadsworth, identified and
authenticated photocopies of the original bid documents at their
depositions, and that these authenticated

copies of the bid

documents are part of their sworn deposition testimony and part of
the record in this case (R. 438 and 439, Deposition Exhibit 1).
Second, a careful review of the four cases cited by Wadsworth
in support of its argument (that the usual standard for review of
a summary judgment is inapplicable in this case, and that a
presumption arises favorable to Wadsworth due to the unavailability
4

of the original bid documents) reveals that these cases are
inapposite.

In three of these cases,1 when the original documents

were lost or destroyed, there were no photocopies or duplicates of
the lost or missing documents available which could be used in
their place as evidence.

As a result, in the absence of such

photocopies or duplicates, there was a complete lack of evidence
of the contents of the missing documents in question.

In the

fourth case,2 there were no lost or missing documents involved, but
only the failure by one of the parties to call certain witnesses
who possessed relevant knowledge of the facts.

Thus, in each of

these four cases, the courts found it necessary to create an
evidentiary presumption due to the complete lack of any relevant
evidence.
By

contrast,

in the present

case, the

record

contains

photocopies of the bid documents which have been authenticated by
Wadsworth's employees at their depositions and which are properly
admissible as evidence under the above-cited rules of evidence.
In addition, the record in this case contains affidavit testimony
of witnesses who have examined the original bid documents in
question (R. 289-330). Thus, in the present case, there is no lack
of evidence as to the contents of the original documents, and, as

1

Public Health Trust v. Valcin. 507 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1987);
Nation-Wide Check v. Forest Hills Distributors. 692 F.2d 214
(1982); Carr v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 384 F.Supp.
821 (1974).
2

Whitney v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, 374 P.2d 441 (Oregon
1962).
5

a result, no necessity to create any evidentiary presumption.
Accordingly, the Court should reject Wadsworth1s argument that
the usual standard for review of a summary judgment does not apply
in the present case, and the Court should view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the County.
POINT II
THE STATEMENT OF FACTS SET FORTH IN WADSWORTH1 S BRIEF
IGNORES ALL OF THE FACTS FAVORABLE TO THE COUNTY, IS
INACCURATE AS TO CERTAIN FACTS, AND IMPROPERLY VIEWS THE
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO WADSWORTH.
In its brief, Wadsworth does not directly address or discuss
the Statement of Facts set forth on pages 5 through 11 of the
County's opening brief (Brief of Appellants).

Instead, Wadsworth

asserts certain statements under the heading "Undisputed Facts",
many of which are inaccurate and are strongly disputed by the
County.

In addition, Wadsworth's statement of the facts ignores

all of the facts favorable to the County.
On page 7 of its brief, Wadsworth alleges it "...submitted to
Salt Lake County its bid schedule, written in ink ctnd its total bid
was also written in ink. . ." and that "All amounts in the bid
schedule submitted by Wadsworth were entered in ink...." (Emphasis
added).
record

Contrary to Wadsworth's allegation, the evidence in the
shows that several boxes in Wadsworth!s bid

contained

multiple

entries written

in both

ink

schedule

and pencil.

Wadsworth entered two different unit prices on Schedule D for Item
No. 1 Basin Floodwalls ($90 in ink and $140 in pencil, which were
extended out to $179,100 in ink and $278,600 in pencil), and these

6

two prices were also listed

in the subtotal for Schedule D

($207,159.10 in ink and $306,659.10 in pencil) and in the Bidding
Schedule Summary.

Two different prices were also entered in the

box for the Total Bid Price ($692,634.48 in ink and $792,134.48 in
pencil). After the engineering consultant corrected for extension
errors contained in Wadsworth's bid proposal, Wadsworth's two total
bid prices were $692,640.48 for the ink figures and $792,140.48 for
the pencil figures (R. 293, 297, 302, 438 and 439, Deposition
Exhibit 1).
On page 8 of its brief, Wadsworth refers to the pencil prices
as "...other isolated and occasional light pencil notations in the
margins of the Bid Schedule." A review of Deposition Exhibit 1 (R.
4 38 and 439) shows that the pencil prices were not entered in the
margins of the Bid Schedule, but instead were entered immediately
above the ink figures within the price boxes.

It should be noted

that the illegible copy of the Bid Schedule attached to Wadsworth's
brief as addendum 1 has never been authenticated and is a copy of
an illegible copy which was attached to Wadsworth's complaint.
The only properly identified and authenticated copies of the Bid
Schedule are contained in the record at 438 and 439 as Deposition
Exhibit 1.
Wadsworth also alleges that the pencil figures "...did not add
up." A review of the official bid tabulation (R. 294-302) prepared
by the consulting engineer shows that neither the ink prices nor
the pencil prices submitted by Wadsworth added up, as a result of
extension errors contained in Wadsworth's bid; however, these
7

extension errors were corrected by the engineering consultant, and
the contract was awarded based on the engineer's corrected totals
(R. 293, 272).
Wadsworth also alleges that "Wadsworth intended that only the
figures written in ink be part of the bid..." (Emphasis added).
This

allegation

is

directly

contradicted

by

the

deposition

testimony of Guy Wadsworth that "We wanted to put a contingency
number in in case I had made a serious mistake," and "...we wanted
to hedge our bets, I guess."

(R. 439, p. 7).

Moreover, as

discussed under Point IV below, it is not the subjective intent of
a bidder which is determinative, but rather the actual contents of
the bid proposal.
On page 9 of its brief, Wadsworth alleges that "At the County
Commission meeting concerning Wadsworth's bid, Commissioner Barker
stated that it was clear that Wadsworth intended the inked figure
of $692,634.48 as its bid."

Contrary to this allegation, the

official Minute Book of the Board of County Commissioners states
that "Commissioner Barker felt the bid was clearly ambiguous." (R.
317, emphasis added).

Commission Barker also stated

in his

affidavit that one of the reasons for rejecting Wadsworth's bid
proposal was that it was "...ambiguous as to the total price." (R.
314) .
As

shown

above,

the

statement

of

facts

set

forth

in

Wadsworth's brief is inaccurate as to certain facts, ignores all
facts favorable to the County, and improperly views the evidence
in the light most favorable to Wadsworth. Accordingly, the County
8

respectfully submits that the Court should view the evidence in a
light more favorable to the County as set forth in the Statement
of Facts contained

in the Countyfs opening brief

(Brief of

Appellants).
POINT III
THE COUNTY DOES NOT CLAIM THAT IT HAS DISCRETION TO AWARD
PUBLIC CONTRACTS TO WHOMEVER IT WANTS.
In its brief, Wadsworth misrepresents the Countyfs position
and misstates the County's argument on the issue of the discretion
of

the

board

of

county

commissioners

in

awarding

public

construction contracts. On page 12 of its brief, Wadsworth states:
Salt Lake County contends, however, that it has the
discretion to award contracts to whomever it wants
regardless the County's own ordinance and bid documents
mandating the award to the low responsible bidder.
Contrary to the statement in Wadsworth's brief, the County has
never contended that it has discretion to award contracts to
whomever it wants. Nor has the County ever contended that it has
discretion to ignore its own ordinance or bid documents.
Rather, it is the County's position that the board of county
commissioners is vested by law with the discretion to determine:
(1)

whether or not a bid proposal is responsive to the County's

invitation for bids, consistent with the County's ordinance and bid
documents, and (2) whether or not to waive informalities in a bid
proposal, consistent with the County's ordinance and bid documents.
In the present case, under the Instructions to Bidders and the
Rules Governing Bids contained in the County's Invitation to Bid,
the County had discretion to evaluate the responsiveness of the
9

bids it received and to determine whether or not to waive any
informalities in those bids:
1:3:03
Changes in or additions to the bid form,
recapitulations of the work bid upon, alternative
proposals, or any other modification of the bid form
which is not specifically called for in the contract
documents may result in the Countyfs rejection of the bid
as not being responsive to the invitation.
(Emphasis
added.)
1:3:04
The Board of County Commissioners reserves the
right to reject any and all proposals, and to waive any
informality in the proposal r€>ceived.
The discretion vested in public procurement officials includes
the discretion to evaluate bids as well as the discretion to
determine the compliance of a bid with the specifications and the
instructions to prospective bidders:
It is a general rule that bids for public contracts
must substantially comply with the requirements of the
specifications for bidding and the directions to
prospective bidders. The determination as to whether
these requirements are satisfied and the awarding of a
contract are acts of discretion which will be enjoined
only if done illegally, arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unreasonably. (Emphasis added.)
State v. Weisz & Sons. Inc., 713 P.2d 176, at 186 (Wyo. 1986).
Moreover, the determination

by a public

agency

of the

responsiveness or non-responsiveness

of a bid is within the

agency's

judicial

discretion,

subject,

on

review,

to

an

ascertainment that there was a "reasonable basis" for the agency's
action.

State v. Bowers Office Products, Inc.. 621 P.2d 11, at 13

(Alaska 1980); Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, at 917-18 (Alaska
1971).
Accordingly, contrary to the statement in Wadsworth's brief,

10

the County does not claim that it has discretion to award public
contracts to whomever it wants. Nor does the County claim that it
has discretion to ignore its own ordinance and bid documents.

It

is the County's claim that it properly exercised its discretion,
consistent with its ordinance and bid documents, and that it had
a "reasonable basis" for rejecting Wadsworth's bid proposal as nonresponsive. Thus, the Court should disregard Wadsworth's statement
which misrepresents the County's position on this issue.
POINT IV
WADSWORTH WAS NOT THE LOWEST RESPONSIVE, RESPONSIBLE
BIDDER ON THE PROJECT, BECAUSE ITS BID PROPOSAL WAS NONRESPONSIVE TO THE COUNTY'S INVITATION FOR BIDS.
The County agrees with Wadsworth that, pursuant to county
ordinance, when the County awards a public construction contract,
the award must be made to the lowest responsive, responsible
bidder.

The County also agrees that Wadsworth is a responsible

contractor, i.e., properly licensed and able to perform the work
in an acceptable manner.

The parties disagree, however, on the

issue of whether or not Wadsworth's bid proposal was responsive to
the County's invitation for bids.
The evidentiary facts and legal arguments in support of the
County's position that Wadsworth's bid proposal was non-responsive
to the County's invitation for bids are fully stated in the
County's opening brief (Brief of Appellants, pp. 5-11 and 18-22)
and will not be repeated here.
Wadsworth's position that the County wrongfully rejected
Wadsworth's bid as non-responsive is based upon the argument that
11

the County should have ignored the pencil prices in Wadsworth's bid
since the instructions to bidders state that:
1.2.04
On the bidding schedule of the proposal form
the unit prices shall be written in ink or typed both in
words and numerals. In cases of discrepancy the amount
in words shall be construed to be the desired amount.
Wadsworth's argument that the County should have ignored the
pencil prices is without merit for the following reasons:
First, by entering two unit prices on Schedule D for Item No.
1 Basin Floodwalls, one in pencil and one in ink, Wadsworth
violated the above instruction to bidders which required all
entries to be in ink or typed.
was not responsive.

For that reason alone, Wadsworth

Wadsworth further violated this instruction

by failing to write its unit prices in both words and numerals,
which would have cleared up any discrepancy as to the desired
(intended) amount.

Here, again, Wadsworth was not responsive.

Wadsworth's own failure to follow the above instructions to bidders
resulted in confusion as to which number should be used and, as a
result, rendered Wadsworth's bid ambiguous. The purpose for which
these

instructions

ambiguity.

are

given

is to

eliminate

confusion

and

Had Wadsworth followed the above instructions, by

writing all of its prices in ink, and only in ink, and by writing
its prices

in both words and numerals, as required

by the

instructions, there would have been no discrepancy or ambiguity.
Nor would there have been any resulting confusion as to which
numbers should be used (see Wadsworth's letter dated July 31, 1985
at R. 439, Deposition Exhibit 2).

12

Instead, Wadsworth violated

these instructions and now seeks to profit from its own violation•
Second, contrary to Wadsworth's contention, the multiple-price
irregularity in Wadsworth's bid not only made its bid ambiguous as
to the total price, but also gave Wadsworth an unfair competitive
advantage by allowing Wadsworth to claim either of the two bid
prices as its intended bid after the bids were opened.
Because the County retains the discretion to waive the ink
requirement and the requirement that all prices be in writing as
well

as

in numbers, as

"informalities", if

it had

been to

Wadsworth's advantage to have the pencil prices considered as its
bid, Wadsworth could have claimed it intended the higher pencil
prices and insisted that the pencil informality be waived under
rule 1.3.04, set forth above.
However, because Wadsworth!s two total price figures straddled
the total price figure submitted by Gerber, Wadsworth claimed after
the bids were opened that the lower figure was its intended bid.
By submitting two alternative prices, Wadsworth placed itself in
a position where it could claim either of the two prices as its
intended bid, depending upon which one turned out to be the most
advantageous to Wadsworth after the bids were opened.
Wadsworth also argues that any confusion caused by the
irregularity in its bid proposal should have been cleared up by
the letter sent to the County two days after the bid opening. The
letter

stated:

"This

letter

is to

clarify

concerning our bid on referenced project."
Exhibit 2) .

some

confusion

(R. 439, Deposition

In the letter, Wadsworth purports to "confirm" that
13

it intended the ink prices and not the pencil prices.
The argument that Wadsworth's post-bid-opening letter should
have cured any irregularity or dispelled any confusion as to
Wadsworth's intent is without merit.

Rule 1.3.03 of the Rules

Governing Bids specifically prohibits any modification of bids
after the bids have been opened. Moreover, Wadsworth's claim, made
after the bid opening, that it "intended" to have only the ink
prices in its bid considered by the County, and not the pencil
prices, is wholly irrelevant. The courts have uniformly held that
the determination of responsiveness must be based solely on the bid
documents themselves as they appear at the time of opening.
Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, at 648 (Fed. Cir.
1989) . To give effect to a subsequent communication which affects
the price of a bid after the bids have been opened would undermine
the competitive bidding process which is intended to insure fair
competition among all bidders.

Toyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd. v. United

States, 597 F.2d 1371, at 1377 (Ct. CI. 1979).
POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE CORRECT STANDARD
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW TO THE BOARD'S DETERMINATION THAT
WADSWORTH'S BID WAS NON-RESPONSIVE TO THE COUNTY'S
INVITATION FOR BIDS.
In its brief, Wadsworth fails to address the issue on appeal
of whether the district court erred by failing to apply the correct
standard of judicial review to the determination of the board of
county commissioners as to the responsiveness of Wadsworth's bid.
In cases where it has been alleged, as in the present case,

14

that there has been an improper award of a public construction
contract by a public authority, it is well established that the
appropriate standard of judicial review of the public authority's
decision

is whether

or

not

the public

authority

has acted

arbitrarily or capriciously or has otherwise abused its discretion.
In its opening brief, the County cites authorities for the
proposition that, while it is a court's duty to review the action
of public officials in awarding a contract, the court should not
interfere with the decision of the public officials, nor substitute
the court's judgment for that of the public officials, unless there
is

evidence

of

abuse

of

discretionf

fraud,

collusion,

or

misconduct. And, the legal test applied by the courts to determine
if there has been an abuse of discretion is whether or not the
public officials had a "reasonable basis" for their decision. (See
discussion and authorities cited in the County's opening brief
(Brief of Appellants), pp. 14-18.)
In view of Wadsworth's failure to discuss this issue or to
address the legal authorities cited in the County's brief, it would
appear that Wadsworth concedes this point.
POINT VI
THERE WAS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN THE COUNTY AND WADSWORTH.
In its brief, Wadsworth argues that "fundamental principles
of contract law" clearly establish the existence of an "express
preliminary contract" between the County and Wadsworth. Wadsworth
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cites two Utah cases3 in support of this argument.
However, an examination of these cases reveals that both of
them are inapposite. Neither of these cases involved the awarding
of public contracts or bidding disputes.

The Resource Management

case involved a suit for specific performance on an oil and gas
royalty rights contract.

The Suaarhouse Finance case involved a

suit for the nonpayment of a promissory note.
More on point is the case of Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527
P.2d 651 (Utah 1974).

In Rapp, the Utah Supreme Court specifically

addressed the issue of whether a bid proposal submitted in response
to an invitation to bid for a public construction contract creates
any contractual relationship, either express or implied, between
the bidder and the public authority which invites the bids.
In Rapp, the Court concluded that an advertisement for bids
is not itself an offer, rather the bid is the offer, which creates
no

right

until

accepted.

The

Court

further

stated

that,

particularly in the case of public contracts, the requirement of
certain formalities by law, such as a written contract, indicates
that even after acceptance of a bid, there is no contract until
there has been compliance will the required formalities, such as
a signed written contract.

527 P.2d, at 654.

In the present case, the County's invitation for bids was not
an offer. Rather, it was an invitation for offers, and Wadsworth's

3

Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah
1985); Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah
1980).
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bid proposal was the offer.

Moreover, the fact that Wadsworth's

offer contained a promise to hold its bid open for sixty days and
provide a bid bond does not change Wadsworth's bid proposal from
an offer into an acceptance.

This is basic law in the area of

public construction contracts. See 1 Williston on Contracts, (3rd
Ed.) section 31.
Accordingly, there was no contract, either express or implied,
between the County and Wadsworth, and the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in Wadsworth's favor under a breach of
contract theory.
POINT VII
WADSWORTH IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER MONETARY DAMAGES IN
THE NATURE OF LOST PROFITS UNDER THE THEORIES OF BREACH
OF CONTRACT OR NEGLIGENCE.
On page 22 of its brief, Wadsworth acknowledges that "many
courts" have held that a wrongfully rejected bidder is not entitled
to recover lost profits.

However, Wadsworth argues that these

cases are inapplicable to the present case. Wadsworth's argument
is without merit.
Although courts which have addressed this issue have held that
a wrongfully rejected bidder on a public construction contract may
prosecute an action against the awarding authority for injunction,
mandamus, or declaratory judgment, the courts have uniformly held
that there is no remedy against the awarding authority for damages
in the nature of lost profits, under either a breach of contract
or negligence theory. Annotation: Public Contracts: Low Bidder's
Monetary Relief Against State or Local Agency for Nonaward of
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Contract, 65 ALR4th 93; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd
Ed.)# section 29.86; Stein, Construction Law, Vol. 1, section
2.03[3][c] (Matthew Bender, 1990).
This well-established rule of law is based upon sound public
policy reasons which are more fully discussed in the above-cited
Annotation and in the County's opening brief (Brief of Appellants,
pp. 30-32) and which will not be repeated here.
In its brief, Wadsworth cites the case of Southern California
Acoustics Co., Inc. v. C.V. Holder, Inc.. 456 P.2d 975 (Cal. 1969),
for the proposition that "a wrongfully rejected bidder under a
municipal bidding statute is entitled to recover monetary damages,
including lost profits."

However, a careful review of this case

indicates that no award of lost profits was made against the public
authority awarding the construction contract.

Instead, the Court

in Southern California Acoustics only held that the plaintiff, a
subcontractor,

could

recover

lost

profits

from

the

general

contractor which had improperly substituted another subcontractor
for the plaintiff. The Court specifically held that the plaintiff
could not recover lost profits from the public authority (a school
district) which had awarded the construction contract.
The County acknowledges thait courts in a few jurisdictions
have begun to allow a wrongfully rejected bidde»r to recover bid
preparation

costs

circumstances.4

(but

not

lost

profits)

under

certain

See Stein, Construction Law, Vol. 1, section

See cases cited in
Appellants) on pp. 31-32.

County's
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opening

brief

(Brief

of

2.03[3][c]; see also Annotation, 65 ALR4th 93.
however, a position of very few courts.

That remains,

More important, and

controlling in this situation, is the decision of the Utah Supreme
Court in the Rapp case, which adopted the majority position that
an unsuccessful bidder may not recover bid preparation costs from
the awarding public authority.

As a result, in Utah, as in the

majority of other jurisdictions, an unsuccessful bidder must seek
a timely remedy for equitable relief in the nature of injunction,
mandamus, or declaratory relief.
On page 23 of its brief, Wadsworth states "...that Rapp should
no longer be considered valid law in this state in view of the
trend to award monetary damages to wrongfully rejected bidders."
The County submits that Rapp is the law in this state, and further,
that it is consistent with the great weight of authority in the
majority of other jurisdictions.
Accordingly, Wadsworth is not entitled to recover damages in
the nature of lost profits, and the district court erred in
awarding lost profits as the measure of damages in this case.
POINT VIII
EVEN IF, ARGUENDO, WADSWORTH WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
DAMAGES IN THE NATURE OF LOST PROFITS, WADSWORTH FAILED
TO CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES, THEREBY
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Wadsworth had the burden of proof as to the amount of lost
profits, if any.

For the reasons stated in the County's opening

brief (Brief of Appellants, pp.33-35), Wadsworth failed to meet its
burden of proof.
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Wadsworthfs claimed amount of lost profits was speculative and
uncertain due to the lack of foundation and documentation, and
genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to this issue
thus precluding summary judgment*
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the County respectfully requests
that the Court vacate the summary judgment entered by the district
court below and remand this case for further proceedings,
DATED this

day of December, 1990.
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Salt Lake County Attorney
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